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Still More Ado About Dirty Books (and Pictures):
Stanley, Reidel, and Thirty-seven Photographs
Existing confusion in the field of constitutional obscenity doctrine
has been compounded by the Supreme Court's recent decisions in
United States v. Reidel' and United States v. Thirty-seven Photo-
graphs.2 Rejecting arguments that the principles announced in Stanley
v. Georgia3 precluded all but limited governmental regulation of ob-
scene material,4 the Court reaffirmed two federal obscenity statutes in
Reidel and 37 Photos,5 dampening speculation that obscenity was
slowly being drawn within the First Amendment's protective sweep.
Yet Stanley's declaration that private possession of obscene material in
the home is constitutionally protected has not been disavowed. This
Note will suggest a doctrinal framework for future obscenity cases
which reconciles Stanley's concern for protecting individual First
Amendment interests with the governmental power to regulate obscene
material, as upheld in Reidel and 37 Photos.
I. Stanley and the Two-Level Theory
Since 1957, the contours of the Supreme Court's obscenity doctrine
have been those established by the celebrated case of Roth v. United
States.6 Although the Court had previously suggested that obscenity
was not a constitutionally protected form of expression,7 Roth was the
first case in which this rule was explicitly stated:8 "We hold that ob-
1. 402 U.S. 351 (1971), rev'g No. 5845-HP-Crim. (C.D. Cal. June 8, 1970) (unreported).
See pp. 320-22 infra for a discussion of the case.
2. 402 U.S. 363 (1971), rev'g 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (three.judge court). See
pp. 323-25 infra for a discussion of the case.
3. 394 US. 557 (1969). See pp. 314-15 infra for a discussion of the case.
4. See generally pp. 321-24 infra.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970), which prohibits knowing use of the mails for transmission
of obscenity, was upheld in United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). United States
v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), upheld 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970), which
prohibits importation of obscene or immoral articles and establishes forfeiture proceedings.
6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Roth opinion incorporated two cases, Roth v. United
States and Alberts v. California. The first raised the constitutionality of a federal statute
that made it a crime to transmit obscene material through the mails. The second in-
volved a California law prohibiting the sale or distribution of obscene material or its
advertisement. After determining that obscene expression was unprotected by the First
Amendment, the Court upheld both statutes.
7. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 US. 250, 256, 266 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
8. Obscenity cases had been before the Court on two previous occasions but neither
case produced a square decision on obscenity's constitutional status. Kahven, The Meta-
physics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 7-8. In Doubleday & Co. v. New-.-
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scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press." 9 The exclusion of obscenity from constitutional protection
meant that the government was not required to justify its suppression
of obscene material1 ° in traditional First Amendment terms." Instead,
stripped of the protections normally granted to expression under the
First Amendment, obscene expression could be freely regulated sub-
ject only to the due process requirement that such regulation be
rationally adapted to serve ends within the scope of government
power.12 The Court's dichotomy, distinguishing between protected
speech and unprotected obscenity, has been termed the "two-level
theory."'13 It employs a definitional basis to establish constitutional
discrimination between two classes of expression.14
The Roth plurality defined obscenity on the basis of "whether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest."' 5 Having elevated the definition of obscenity to the level
of constitutional doctrine, the post-Roth Court was forced to adjudi-
cate almost every new development in pornographic creativity. But
since the Justices were not in agreement on a definition of obscenity,
or indeed whether obscenity was a separate category of speech at all,16
York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), the Court divided equally to uphold without opinion a New
York obscenity statute. In Butler v. Michigan; 352 U.S. 380 (1957), the Court unanimously
declared a Michigan obscenity statute unconstitutionally overbroad because it banned
sales to the general public of books merely deemed unfit for juveniles. The broader
question of whether books deemed unfit for adults could be prohibited was not reached.
9. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
10. Id. at 486-87.
11. The free expression formulas used by members of the Court to determine when
protected speech may legitimately be regulated-"bad tendency," "clear and present
danger," "ad hoc balancing of interests," and the "absolutist" position-are all premised
on the belief that speech qua speech is no evil. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FisT AMENDMENT 50-58 (1963). Government's regulation of protected
speech may be justified only on the basis of the risks posed by its anticipated con-
sequences.
12. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968). See also Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
13. Kalven, supra note 8, at 10-17.
14. Obscenity was not the first class of expression held unprotected by the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (libel); Chaplinsky v,
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (insulting or "fighting words"). But see note 19 infra.
15. 354 U.S. at 489. For criticism of this test and general commentary on the Roth
decision see Kalven, supra note 8, and Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity,
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960).
16. Despite the fact that the term "obscene" has been found sufficiently precise to
resist a "vagueness" attack, United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957), a verbal
definition of obscenity has consistently eluded a majority of the Court. The definition
which has most recently commanded a plurality of the Court defines obscenity as char-
acterized by three elements: a dominant theme appealing to prurient interests, patent
offensiveness to community standards, and content utterly without redeeming social
value. A Book v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (opinion of Brennan, J,, joined
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the result was a morass of cases and individual opinions17 evidencing
a good deal of doctrinal confusion.' 8
The Court's 1969 decision in Stanley, however, appeared to be a
step away from the definitional approach to obscenity, toward place-
ment of the obscenity problem within traditional First Amendment
doctrines. Paralleling the abandonment of the two-level theory in
libel,19 the Court in Stanley appeared to hold that obscenity was not
by Warren, C.J., and Fortas, J.) [hereinafter cited as Memoirs]. Justice White accepts
the first two elements of this definition but believes the latter element is merely a
consideration in determining the first. Id. at 460-63 (dissenting opinion). Justice Stewart
defines obscenity as "hard-core pornography" which meets the "I know it when I see
it" test. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion); see also Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 497 (1966) (dissenting opinion). Justice Harlan embrace
variable standards, believing that all but "hard.core pornography" was protected from
federal regulation while states must only "apply criteria rationally related to the ac-
cepted notion of obscenity and ... reach results not wholly out of step with current
American standards." Memoirs, supra, at 458 (dissenting opinion); compare Ginl:bumg,
supra, at 493 (dissenting opinion). Finally, Justices Douglas and Black have rejected the
two-level theory entirely and would give obscenity the same full constitutional protection
accorded other forms of speech. See, e.g., Roth, supra, at 508 (dissenting opinion);
Memoirs, supra, at 424 (dissenting opinion); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650
(1968) (dissenting opinion). Only in the rare case where the allegedly obscene material
fails to fall within any of this mclange of standards can the Court produce a majority
opinion. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam).
Moreover, this spectrum of obscenity definitions is confused stilt further by the intro-
duction of other factors which may affect a determination of obscenity Vel non. See
Ginzburg, supra (evidence of pandering material to a finding of obscenit)); Miskin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (prurient interest appeal may be determined by reference
to tastes of group at whom material aimed); Ginsberg, supra (minors may be protected
from material which would not be obscene for adults).
17. One lower court registered a vigorous protest:
Recently there has been a flood of decisions attempting to cope with obscenity.
These cases vary as to facts and statutes applied and construed. Another anat)sis of
this rapidly expanding and confusing field could not supply any new delicacy to
this smorgasbord. Particularly is this so when one observes that members of the
Supreme Court have written 55 separate opinions in 13 cases on the subject of
obscenity in the 10 years prior to 1968 and have not been able to agree on what
it is or how to deal with It.
Adler v. Pomerleau, 313 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.Md. 1970).
18. See Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 136 (1966), for an
excellent critique of the origins of the Roth decision and an examination of the uin-
certainties created by the Court's decisions in A Book v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413
(1966), Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), and Mishkin v. New York, 383
U.S. 502 (1966).
19. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 255 (1964), the two-lesel approach
to libel was largely abandoned in the Court's holding that libel against public officials
by critics of their official conduct is subject to First Amendment protection unless
uttered with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 283. T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 487 (1970). A similar demise was then
predicted for the two-level theory in obscenity doctrine. Kalven, Tie New York Timles
Case, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 204-05, 212-13, 217.
Subsequent decisions by the Court, expanding the scope of the New York Titles
doctrine, have furnished the coup de grdce to the two-level theory in libel doctrine. See
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967) (together with Associated Press v. Walker).
A recent decision, Gooding v. Wilson, 40 U.S.L.W. 4329 (U.S. March 23, 1972), suggests
that the Court may be sharply limiting the scope of the two-level theory with regard
to "insulting" or "fighting words." In Gooding a Georgia statute, making the use of
'!abusive language" in the presence of another person a crime, ias declared unconstitu-
tional on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.
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wholly excluded from First Amendment protection.20 Although Stan-
ley was limited to private possession of obscene materials in the home,
to the extent that the Court gave any First Amendment protection to
material assumed obscene it undermined the two-level theory's major
premise-that such material is entirely excluded from the First Amend-
ment. This observation, and the balancing of interests process by
which the majority reached its decision in Stanley,21 persuaded some
commentators that the two-level theory had been abandoned entirely,22"
despite an explicit reaffirmation of Roth.
23
The belief that Stanley implied a dramatic shift in Supreme Court
obscenity doctrine was shared by a number of lower courts. 2" Perhaps
the paradigm case giving Stanley's doctrine a broad sweep was
Karalexis v. Byrne,25 which enjoined state prosecution of a theater
owner under Massachusetts obscenity laws for exhibiting I Am Curious
(Yellow) in a public theater. Writing for two members of a three-judge
panel, Judge Aldrich began by assuming that the film would be ob-
scene under the standards of Roth and subsequent cases.20 While
noting Stanley's reaffirmation of Roth, Aldrich argued:
Yet, with due respect, Roth cannot remain intact, for the Court
there had announced that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press," . . . whereas it held
that Stanley's interest was protected by the First Amendment
and that the fact that the film was "devoid of any ideological
content" was irrelevant.
27
20. We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere
private possession of obscene material a crime.
394 U.S. 568 (footnote omitted). See note 24 infra for examples of lower court decisions
which interpreted Stanley as bringing obscenity within the First Amendment.
21. See 394 U.S. at 565-68.
22. See, e.g., Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Law is Changing, 68 Micit. L.
REV. 185 (1969); Note, The New Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 57 CALMF. L. R v
1257 (1969). But see T. EMERsoN, supra note 19, at 485; Comment, 56 VA. L. REv. 1205
(1970).
23. 394 U.S. at 568.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970); La Rue v,
California, 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. B. & H. Dist. Corp., 319
F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 403 U.S. 927 (1971); United States v. Articles of
"Obscene" Merchandise, 315 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 935 (1970);
United States v. Langford, 315 F. Supp. 472 (D. Minn. 1970); United States v. Lethe, 312
F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Cal. 1970); Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp, 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969),
vacated on other grounds sub nor. Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
But see United States v. Fragus, 422 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1970); ABC Books, Inc. v,
Benson, 315 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Tenn. 1970); Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D.
Ga. 1969); May v. Harper, 306 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. Fla. 1969); Great Speckled Bird of
Atlanta Coop. N.P. v. Stynchombe, 298 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
25. 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), temporary injunction stayed pending appeal,
396 U.S. 976 (1969), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
26. Id. at 1365. But see United States v. A Motion Picture Film, 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.
1968) (holding the movie I Am Curious (Yellow) not obscene).
27. 306 F. Supp. at 1366 (footnotes omitted).
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Rejecting the contention that Stanley rested on Fourth Amend-
ment privacy grounds, 28 Judge Aldrich concluded in effect that state
regulation of obscenity could be premised only upon an affirmative
showing of legitimate state interests. An allegation that obscenity was
harmful per se was held insufficient,20 leaving, as suggested in Stanley,30
only two permissible state interests to justify the regulation of ob-
scenity: protection of minors and preventing the intrusion of ob-
scenity on public sensibilities. Since the theater in question barred
admission to minors, warned patrons in advance of the film's nature
so that they would not be taken by surprise, and carried on inoffensive
advertising, Judge Aldrich concluded that the State of Massachusetts
had no interest on which to base its prosecution. 3
Despite the extensive consideration given to the Stanley decision in
the lower courts, 32 no occasion arose for a full Supreme Court opinion
on its rapidly expanding scope3 3 until the decisions in Reidel and
37 Photos, late in the 1970-71 Term. In both cases, lower federal courts
had concluded that, at a minimum, Stanley sharply limited Roth.
Abandoning the two-level theory, the lower courts had determined
through a balancing of interests rationale that the federal statutes in
question, which regulated obscene materials, were unconstitutional.34
The Supreme Court, however, in two opinions by Justice White, ruled
that the doctrine in Stanley did not reach distribution or importation
of obscene material and therefore that such activities could be pro-
28. Id. at n.5.
29. Of necessity the Stanley Court held that obscenity presented no clear and
present danger to the adult viewer, or to the public as a result of his e.lposure.
Obscenity may be offensive; it is not harmful... . Had the Court considered ob-
scenity harmful as such, the fact that the defendant possessed it privately in his home
would have been of no consequence.
Id. at 1366 (footnotes omitted).
80. 394 U.S. at 567.
31. 306 F. Supp. at 1366. Judge Aldrich also felt compelled to spell out what remained
of Roth since Karalexis quite obviously gave the coup de grdce to the two.level theory:
[W]e think it probable that Roth remains intact only with respect to public dis.
tribution in the full sense, and that restricted distribution, adequately controlled,
is no longer to be condemned.
32. Between 1969 and 1972 more than fifty cases in lower federal courts alone in-
volved consideration of the scope of the Stanley decision.
33. Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969). which essentially limited
Stanley to its facts, was affirmed without opinion. 397 U.S. 592 (1970). Two cases giving
Stanley a broad sweep, Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969). and Stein
v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969), were vacated on procedural grounds.
See note 24 supra. Any possible pattern emerging from these actions was destroyed by
the Court's dismissal, without opinion, 400 U.S. 935 (1970), of the government's appeal
from United States v. Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise, 315 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), which had also given Stanley a broad construction.
34. See pp. 320-21 and p. 323 infra for discussion of the lower court opinions in
Reidel and 37 Photos.
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hibited under Roth.3 5 The two-level theory in constitutional obscenity
doctrine suddenly seemed very much alive.
In the aftermath of Reidel and 37 Photos, two key questions arise
concerning the future contours of constitutional obscenity doctrine.
(1) Can the doctrinal basis of the Stanley decision be reconciled with
Reidel and 37 Photos? (2) If Stanley has only been partially limited,
how far does its protection of private possession of obscene material
extend? Before considering these questions directly, it is necessary to
re-examine the doctrinal foundation of Stanley, a case whose am-
biguity has led certain commentators and lower courts to misconstrue
dramatically its reach.3 6
II. Stanley Revisited
Under the authority of a search warrant, federal and state agents
had entered Stanley's home to search for "bookmaking materials."
Although little evidence of bookmaking activity was found, while
searching through a desk drawer in an upstairs bedroom of Stanley's
home the agents found several reels of eight millimeter film. Viewing
the films on the premises, the agents concluded they were obscene
and seized them. Stanley was indicted for "knowingly hav[ing] posses-
sion of. .. obscene matter."37 The resulting conviction was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Georgia38 and review was granted by the
United States Supreme Court.
A majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, reversed
Stanley's conviction, declaring:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving govern-
ment the power to control men's minds.30
Mere labeling of the films as obscene, Justice Marshall argued, was
an insufficient justification for such interference with personal lib-
erties.40 State power to regulate obscenity "simply does not extend to
35. See Reidel, 402 U.S. at 355; 37 Photos, 402 U.S. at 376.
36. See notes 22 and 24 supra.
37. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
38. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968).
39. 394 U.S. at 565.
40. Id.
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mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home. '" '
Justice Stewart, writing also for Justices Brennan and White, con-
curred on the grounds that the agents' search warrant conferred no
authority to seize the films, 42 which were therefore inadmissible as
evidence. In another concurring opinion, Justice Black took his tra-
ditional position that obscenity, like other forms of speech, should be
accorded full First Amendment protection.4 3
Confusion regarding the Stanley decision" has undoubtedly been
caused in part by the fact that Justice Marshall's majority opinion ad-
mits of at least two significantly different interpretations. (1) Ob-
scene material is, absent a showing of subordinating state interests,
granted full protection by the First Amendment. (2) Some interaction
between an individual's First Amendment rights, not relating to pos-
session of obscene material, and a locus of privacy creates a special
kind of privacy in which possession of obscene materials may not be
regulated absent a subordinating state interest. These interpretations
of the Stanley decision may be for convenience denoted the First
Amendment theory and the privacy-plus theory45 and are considered
in turn below.
A. The First Amendment Theory of Stanley
Justice Marshall began his Stanley opinion by noting that neither
Roth nor subsequent decisions had dealt with the "precise problem"
posed by Stanley's privately possessed films. Thus, he contended,
[n]one of the statements cited by the Court in Roth for the propo-
sition that "this court has always assumed that obscenity is not
protected by the freedoms of speech and press" were made in the
41. Id. at 568.
42. Id. at 571.
43. Id. at 568-69.
44. Academy., Inc. v. Vance, 320 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (S.D. Tex. 1970), illustrates the
general uncertainty which prevailed in lower courts concerning Stanley's real meaning:
The Court's affirmance of [Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ca. 1969),
aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 592 (1970) ] would seem to furnish the coup de grdce to a broad
interpretation of Stanley. But the presence of [Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363
(D. Mass. 1969)] on the Court's pending calendar dispels such facile assurances.
In rendering a decision in Karalexis, the Supreme Court may at last specify the
extent to which Stanley overrules Roth .... In anticipation of that elucidation, wve
shall postpone a final ruling on the merits of this case until Karalexis provides
clarification of the current state of obscenity law.
Unhappily, Karalexis was ultimately decided on procedural grounds, leaving Stanleys
scope still undefined. See Byrne v. Karalexis, 400 U.S. 216 (1971).
45. As formulated here, privacy-plus is not equivalent to that which is generally
denominated as a "right to privacy." Fourth Amendment priiacy principles or "privacy
of the home" doctrines are insufficient to explain Stanley's holding. See pp. 317-18 in ra.
The Yale Law Journal
context of a statute punishing mere private possession of obscene
material.40
Of course, Roth and its progeny "do mean that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments recognize a valid governmental interest in deal-
ing with the problem of obscenity."'47 But the assertion of such an
interest, according to Justice Marshall, depends upon the context, and
in Stanley competing constitutional interests were involved48-the pro-
tection of "personal liberties." These, Justice Marshall declared, are
protected from state interference when exercised in the privacy of
the home.4
9
If the majority's opinion had ended at this stage, there would have
been less ambiguity concerning Stanley's scope, as rights to possess
obscene material would have been rather clearly restricted to the home.
But in the process of rebutting Georgia's asserted interests in Stanley's
films, Justice Marshall spelled out grounds which seemingly limited
state regulation of obscene material in any context. Georgia advanced
three interests to justify its seizure of Stanley's obscene films: (1)
protecting the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity; (2)
stopping crimes of sexual violence, which allegedly entailed prevent-
ing exposure to obscene material; and (3) eliminating public dis-
tribution of obscenity, a policy requiring prohibition of private pos-
session.50 Justice Marshall rejected these three interests, respectively,
as constitutionally impermissible, unsubstantiated, and insufficient to
justify infringement of an individual's right to read or observe what
he pleases. 51
By way of example, Justice Marshall then suggested two subordinat-
ing state interests which might justify state regulation of obscene ma-
terial: protection of children from exposure to obscenity and prevent-
ing intrusions on the sensibilities of the public.52 He observed that
"[n]o such dangers are present in this case,"53 but implied that public
distribution of obscene material might well justify state intervention
46. 394 U.S. at 560-61.
47. Id. at 563.
48. See p. 318 and note 61 infra.
49. See 394 U.S. at 565.
50. Id. at 565-68.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 567. Both interests had been previously recognized by the Court as suf-
ficiently substantial to justify regulation of obscenity. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.
767, 769-71 (1967). However, no Court opinion had ever suggested that these were the
only permissible state interests.
53. 394 U.S. at 567.
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to protect these interests. The converse, however, seemed apparent.
Whenever these two legitimate state interests were not threatened,
obscenity would be protected from state regulation by the First Amend-
ment.
In a concluding footnote, Justice Marshall, distinguishing the status
of obscene materials from that of other things, provided additional
support for a First Amendment view of Stanley:
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the
State or Federal government to make possession of other items,
such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods a crime .... No First
Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making mere
possession criminal.4
One obvious anomaly remains in a First Amendment theory of
Stanley. At the conclusion of his opinion Justice Marshall explicitly
declared that Roth and its progeny had not been "impaired,"'' an odd
statement in yiew of the two-level theory's premise that obscenity is
wholly excluded from the First Amendment. One possible explanation
suggested by Justice Marshall's analysis is that in those contexts, such
as unrestricted public distribution, in which it is determined that
subordinating state interests are present, the state may treat obscene
material as if it were not protected by the First Amendment.a In those
contexts and to that extent, Roth and the two-level theory were not
impaired.
B. The Privacy-Plus Theory of Stanley
Although the First Amendment theory fully rationalizes the Stanley
decision, Justice Marshall repeatedly noted that the First Amendment
interests attributed to Stanley were being exercised in the privacy of
his own home. It might thus be thought that this "added dimension"15
in Stanley was in fact the only dimension, and that the decision may
be explained by a privacy of the home theory or by Fourth Amend-
ment privacy principles. If these privacy doctrines are believed to ex-
plain Stanley fully, then it must be assumed ab initio that obscenity
itself remains constitutionally unprotected under the two-level theory.
54. Id. at 568 n.11 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 568.
56. This conclusion is suggested by Justice Marshall's discussion of the application
of Roth to public distribution. See id. at 567.
57. Id. at 564.
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But once this assumption is granted, a strict privacy interpretation
of Stanley becomes untenable. Privacy of the home underlies the re-
quirement under the Fourth Amendment that authorities obtain a
valid search warrant prior to entry.aS But privacy of the home cannot
preclude entry of the home by the state when there exists probable
cause that prohibited articles-narcotics, unregistered firearms or ob-
scenity under the two-level theory-are situated on the premises and a
valid search warrant is obtained from the appropriate judicial au-
thorities.
In Stanley's particular case the strict privacy of home argument is
even weaker. The privacy of Stanley's home had been lawfully invaded
prior to the discovery of the films. Stanley could hardly have objected
to their seizure on the ground that the privacy of his home had then
suddenly been disturbed. It might be suggested that it was the un-
warranted seizure of the films from the upstairs bedroom which com-
prised the unconstitutional state action; yet this was exactly the point
made by the Justices concurring on Fourth Amendment grounds,
an argument the Stanley majority chose not to follow.69
However, the inadequacy of a strict privacy of the home rationale
of Stanley does not mean that privacy interests were not a doctrinal
consideration in the case. Justice Marshall denied the application of
Roth's principles to Stanley's situation because the "governmental
interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity" could not be insu-
lated in every context from all constitutional protections. 00 In the en-
suing discussion, two constitutionally protected rights were identi-
fied: "the right to receive information and ideas," and "the right to
be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted govern-
mental intrusions into one's privacy." 61 Although neither right alone
58. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-99 (1958).
Rights of privacy in the home can also establish absolute sanctions against intrusions
by other private parties. In all but exceptional circumstances any unauthorized entry
of the home would constitute trespass. Any person in exclusive possession of the home
at the time of trespass may recover full damages therefore. See 1 F. HARPra & F. JAMES,
THE LAW or TORTS § 1.2 (1956); 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 158 (1965). Under
some conditions, such as a threat of violence, force may be legally used to repel in-
truders from one's home. Id. at § 65; State v. Couch, 52 N.M. 127, 137, 193 l'.2d 405,
410-11 (1948); Hill v. State, 27 Ala. App. 55, 58, 166 So. 60, 62 (1936), cert. denied, 231
Ala. 539, 166 So. 64 (1936). Even a simple knock-on-the-door has been prohibited in the
name of privacy. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
59. 394 U.S. at 571.
60. Id. at 563.
61. Id. at 564. The "right to receive" was subsequently restated by Justice Marshall
in several corollary forms: "the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
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had previously been thought to protect possession or acquisition of
obscene materials, 02 the language of Justice Marshall's opinion sug-
gests that it was the combination of these rights 03 which meant that
mere categorization of [Stanley's] films as 'obscene' [was] insuffi-
cient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liberties
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 4
Thus, to seize Stanley's films, Georgia was constitutionally required to
show a subordinating state interest, which in this case it could not do. 3
For convenience, this combination of constitutionally protected in-
terests has been labeled "privacy-plus."0 " Its doctrinal rationale will be
discussed below, 67 but it is important to note at this point a major
distinction between the two possible theories of the Stanley decision.
Under the First Amendment theory, the state is required to show a
social worth," "the right to read or observe what [one] pleases" and the "right to
satisfy [one's] intellectual and emotional needs." Id. at 564-65. Both the original and
corollary formulations of the "right to receive" derive from one of the major premises
of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression: assuring the means of
individual self-fulfillment. See T. EME.so. supra note 19, at 6.
62. The "right to receive information and ideas" w-as traced by Justice Marshall to
a number of cases. 394 U.S. at 564. None of these cases includes obscenity within the
scope of "the right to receive" and some explicitly reject the possibility. In Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U:S. 141, 143 (1943), for example, the "right to receive" is deriied
from the "right to distribute literature," which is in turn cited to Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938), a case which explicitly suggests that distribution of
obscene literature may be prohibited. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), is cited
by Justice Marshall for "the right to receive information and ideas regardless of social
worth." Stanley, 594 U.S. at 564. But Winters concerned publications exhorting violence
or bloodshed which the Court clearly differentiated from obscene materials:
Though we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines,
they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of litera-
ture ... . They are equally subject to control if they are lewd, indecent, obscene,
or profane.
Winters, supra, at 510.
"The right to be free, etc.," as argued at pp. 317-18 supra, cannot by itself present
invasion of privacy by the state for the purpose of seizing illegal, albeit merely obscene,
material provided a valid search warrant is obtained.
63. In summing up his discussion of the "right to receive" and the "right to be free,"
Justice Marshall observed:
These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us. He is assert-
ing the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual
and emotional needs in the privacy of his home.
394 U.S. at 565. The emphasis appears to be clearly placed on the concurrent exercise
of the two rights.
64. Id.
65. See pp. 316-17 supra.
66. An alternative designation might be a "First Amendment right of privacy."
An excellent analysis suggesting that Stanley's doctrinal foundation results from some
interaction between the First Amendment and privacy principles was made in Comment,
56 VA. L. REv. 1205 (1970). The conclusion there, however, was that the resulting pro-
tection for obscene material in private possession generated a corresponding right to
distribute such material. See id. at 1219-21. Privacy-plus, in contrast, generates no corol-
lary right to sell or distribute obscenity. See pp. 330-32 infra.
67. See pp. 327-32 infra.
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subordinating state interest to justify regulating obscene material in
any context s8 The privacy-plus theory of Stanley, in contrast, speaks
only to the requirement of a subordinating state interest to reach ob-
scene material in a locus of privacy.O In all other contexts the state
is free to regulate obscenity as before, under the two-level theory of
Roth.70 It is in this respect that, under the privacy-plus theory of
Stanley, "Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired
"71
III. Return of Reidel and 37 Photos
The substantial differences between the First Amendment theory
of Stanley and the privacy-plus theory can be illustrated within the
framework of the Reidel decision. Reidel had been indicted for mail-
ing three copies of an illustrated booklet, "The True Facts About
Imported Pornography," in violation of a federal statute prohibiting
the knowing use of the mails for transmission of obscene material.12
One copy of the booklet had been mailed to a postal inspector, stipu-
lated to be an adult.7 3 Assuming for the purposes of a motion to dismiss
the indictment that the booklets were obscene, the district judge ruled
nonetheless that there was "no valid governmental interest . . . that
68. See pp. 316-17 supra.
69. It may be objected that this formulation of privacy-plus merely states that Stanley
established an independent constitutional right to possess obscene material in private.
Justice Harlan suggested that the Stanley decision represented something like this hI
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
There he argued that Stanley was one of the
[n]ew "substantive due process" rules, that is, those that place . . . certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe ....
In this regard he associated Stanley with Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (free-
dorn to express publicly one's opinions about the flag), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (right of marital privacy), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (free-
dom of choice in marriage: "marriage is one-of the 'basic civil rights of man' "). Justice
Harlan's view is persuasive but it lacks a doctrinal foundation. It is suggested at note
124 infra that privacy-plus is not simply one instance of conduct which may not be
proscribed, but is instead a broader doctrine of constitutional limitation on governmental
power to proscribe a number of individual private activities.
70. In the penultimate sentence of his opinion Justice Marshall observed:
As we have said, the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power
simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his
own home.
394 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
73. The other two copies of the booklet had been mailed by Reidel but had been
returned undelivered and were found during a search of Reidel's premises. The prosect.
tion conceded that it had no evidence regarding the age of the intended recipients or
their willingness to receive the booklets.
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would justify a criminal prosecution for distributing this material." 7'
The court implied that the only state interests sufficient to overcome
a right to distribute obscene material were the familiar duo of threats
to children or to an unvilling public.7" Concluding that neither of
these dangers was present in the instant case, the court dismissed the
indictment.
Under the First Amendment theory of Stanley, the dismissal of
Reiders indictment would be justified by extrapolating Reidel's
"right to sell" from Stanley's "right to possess." If the government has
no interest in preventing an individual from receivinig obscene ma-
terial, it can have no greater interest in preventing someone from sell-
ing it to him.76 Alternatively, the prosecution would have been allowed
to proceed, but with only two questions at issue: whether the mailings
risked exposure to minors and whether the materials were being sent
unsolicited.77 Under the privacy-plus theory, however, since the pro-
tected rights78 and zone of privacy involved in Stanley were inap-
plicable to Reidel's situation, there was no constitutional obstacle to
continued prosecution.79
The fact that the Court reversed the dismissal of Reidel's indictment
itself suggests that the First Amendment theory of Stanley was re-
jected. 0 But the Reidel opinion went even further, and explicitly
74. Quoted in Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 13, United States v. Reidel, 402 US.
351 (1971).
75. Id.
76. To reach this result, the complete First Amendment argument would run as
follows: (1) per Stanley the government has no substantial interest in pieventing a
citizen from possessing obscene material; (2) it can have no greater interest in preventing
him from acquiring such material since the only possible purpose for such a restriction
is to prevent him from enjoying his right to possess; (3) if such a "right to receive"
exists as a consequence of the right to possess, the governmental interest is not changed
because a person buys the material instead of receiving it in some other way; (4) if a
person has a right to buy obscene material which the government may not frustrate.
the government may not achieve the same result indirectly by making it a crime to sell
obscenity to him. The only circumstances under which the government would be
permitted to restrict Reidel's dealings would be upon a showing of some legitimate
interest such as protection of minors or preventing intrusions on the privacy of others.
As there was no claim of either interest by the government, the indictment should be
dismissed.
Those lower courts which interpreted Stanley as a partial repudiation of Rotlh fol-
lowed this line of analysis or a close variant. See, e.g., United States v. B. & H. Dist.
Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis. 1970); United States v. Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421
(E.D. Cal. 1970); Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969).
77. To reach this disposition of the Reidel case under a First Amendment theory, the
defendant would be given the affirmative defense of establishing that his distribution
procedures did not threaten legitimate state interests. Such reasoning may form the
basis for Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Reidel, 402 US. at 361-62.
78. See p. 318 and note 61 supra.
79. Unlike the First Amendment theory of Stanley, privacy-plus generates no corollary
right to sell or distribute. See pp. 330-32 infra.
80. The Reidel majority opinion um's delivered by Justice White joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Stewart and Brennan. Justice Harlan held to
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rejected the "right to sell" extrapolation from the "right to receive,"'3 1
primarily on the grounds that this result "would effectively scuttle
Roth, the precise result that Stanley abjured."8 2 The Reidel opinion
begins with the assumption that Roth "remains the law in this Court"'3
and endss4 with the conclusion that "Stanley did not overrule Roth."'3'
But did Reidel overrule Stanley? If Stanley is interpreted under the
First Amendment theory the answer must be affirmative, but a privacy-
plus construction of Stanley offers some ground for reconciliation.
Recognizing that the Stanley majority's grant of protection to Stanley's
asserted rights 0 could not be completely ignored, Justice White wrote:
The personal constitutional rights of those like Stanley to possess
and read obscenity in their homes and their freedom of mind
and thought do not depend on whether the materials are obscene
or whether obscenity is constitutionally protected. Their rights
to have and view that material in private are independently saved
by the Constitution. 7
The doctrinal basis for this assertion was not further elaborated in the
opinion, but privacy-plus, as suggested in the foregoing analysis of
Stanley, would appear to offer the only possible explanation. s
his belief that Stanley merely placed certain kinds of private individual conduct beyond
the power of the state to proscribe, see note 69 supra and note 88 infra, and therefore
concurred on the ground that the federal government may prohibit commercial distribu-
tion of obscene material. 402 U.S. at 357-60. Justice Marshall's concurrence, see note 77
supra, was predicated on his unwillingness to find that Reidel's conduct was not within
a constitutional construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970) without the benefit of a full
trial. 402 U.S. at 361-62. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, adhering to their position
that obscene expression is entitled to full First Amendment protection. 402 U.S. at 379.
81. See note 76 supra.
82. 402 U.S. at 355.
83. Id. at 354.
84. Almost by way of apology Justice White added a postscript to his Reidel opinion
by acknowledging that
there is developing sentiment that adults should have complete freedom to pro'
duce, deal in, possess, and consume whatever communicative materials may appeal
to them and that the law's involvement with obscenity should be limited to those
situations where children are involved or where it is necessary to prevent imposition
on unwilling recipients of whatever age.
402 U.S. at 357. But, he argued, "the task of restructuring the obscenity laws lies with
those who pass, repeal, and amend statutes and ordinances," id., and not, by obvious
implication, with the courts.
85. Id. at 356.
86. Justice White had previously made it clear that he did not interpret these as-
serted rights as "requir[ing] that we fashion or recognize a constitutional right lit
people like Reidel to distribute or sell obscene material." Id. at 356.
87. Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
88. A possible variant is the interpretation given to Stanley by Justice Harlan In
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971), see note 69 supra, an interpretation lie
apparently followed in his Reidel concurrence:
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The rejection of the Stanley First Amendment theory is even more
explicit in 37 Photos, which involved a federal anti-obscenity statute
prohibiting importation of obscene articles.80 Returning from Europe,
Milton Luros arrived at Los Angeles International Airport with 37
photographs in his suitcase. Customs agents seized the photographs
as obscene, and instituted forfeiture proceedings. Stipulating that the
photographs were intended for possible commercial use, Luros coun-
terclaimed and a three-judge court was convened to consider the con-
stitutionality of § 1305 (a) both on its face and as applied to the 37
photographs. The lower court's conclusion that § 1305 (a) was uncon-
stitutional rested on two independent grounds: first, the section failed
to comply with the procedural requirements of Freedman v. Maly-
land;90 and second, the section could not be constitutionally applied
to the seized photographs under the doctrine announced in Stanley."'
Disposing of the Freedman procedural issue,02 Justice White, this
For me, at least, Stanley rests on the proposition that freedom from governmental
manipulation of the content of a man's mind necessitates a ban on punishment for
the mere possession of the memorabilia of a man's thoughts and dreams, unless that
punishment can be related to a state interest of a stronger nature than the simple
esire to proscribe obscenity as such.
402 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added).
89. The statute provides for no criminal sanctions. If materials are determined to
be obscene through in rem proceedings, they are forfeited by the importer.
90. s80 U.S. 51 (1965). See note 92 infra.
91. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36, 37-38 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
To reach the latter result the court reasoned in effect that Stanley's ban on regulation
of privately possessed obscenity was not limited to the home and thus § 1303(a) was
unconstitutional on its face because it prohibited private importation of protected,
albeit obscene, material. Luros was granted standing to raise this argument under the
court's interpretation of standing criteria in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1953).
even though his commercial activity might fall constitutionally within the siveep of
§ 1505(a). See note 95 infra for further discussion of the standing issue in 37 Photos.
The court then seemingly went one step further and declared § 1305(a) unconstitutional
even as applied to importation of obscene material for commercial purposes on the
apparent logic that commercial distribution is required on equal protection grounds to
offset advantages based on wealth:
The First Amendment cannot be construed to permit those who have funds for
foreign travel to bring back constitutionally protected literature while prohibiting
its access by the less affluent.
309 F. Supp. at 38.
92. The district court had ruled 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) unconstitutional because its
seizure and forfeiture procedures did not establish adequate limits on prior restraint
and did not provide for prompt resort to the courts for determination of the obscenity
of the material in question, under the doctrine of Freedman v. Maryland, S0 US. 51
(1965). United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36, 38 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
Justice White admitted that § 1305(a) did not contain the explicit time limits required
by Freedman but argued that construing the statute to incorporate such limits would
be consistent with congressional intent. 402 U.S. at 368-72. (justice Black took vigorous
exception to this construction of congressional intent. Id. at 382-87.) In an unusual piece
of statutory construction, Justice White interpreted § 1305(a)
to require intervals of no more than 14 days from seizure of the goods to the insti-
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time writing for a plurality, first reasoned that if under Reidel Con-
gress could prohibit use of the mails for commercial distribution of
obscenity, then it could equally exclude commercial obscenity from
incoming foreign commerce. 3 Had his opinion stopped at this doc-
trinal stage, Justice White could probably have written for a ma-
jority, as both Justices Harlan and Stewart were prepared to concede
Congress' power to prohibit commercial importation of obscenity.04
But eschewing an opportunity for a narrow decision, 95 he declared
§ 1305 (a) constitutional with regard to importation for "private use
or public distribution"90 and concluded with a ringing reaffirmation
of Roth:
As we held in Roth ... and reiterated today in Reidel ... ob-
scenity is not within the scope of First Amendment protection.
Hence Congress may declare it contraband and prohibit its im-
portation, as it has elected in § 1305 (a) to do.97
A majority of the Court, however, was not prepared to go this far. Four
Justices took clear exception to the plurality's dictum on importation
for private use,98 and one felt that the issue need not be reached.99
tution of judicial proceedings for their forfeiture and no longer than 60 days from
filing of the action to final decision in the district court,
primarily on the ground that such requirements would impose "no undue hardship on
the Government." Id. at 373-74. Since the Government had miraculously stayed within
these manufactured time limits by a single day, § 1305(a) was held constitutional as
applied to the thirty-seven photographs.
This example of judicial activism has apparently not ended with this piece of leg'
islation. After establishing the above time limits, Justice White added, "Of course, we
do not now decide that these are the only constitutionally permissible time limits."
Id. at 374. Presumably if the Government pleads "undue hardship" in some future case,
§ 1305(a) will be further judicially amended.
93. 402 U.S. at 376.
94. See notes 98-99 infra.
95. A narrower decision might have been reached along the following lines. Much as
the Justice construed the statute to avoid the constitutional question posed by Freedman,
see note 92 supra, he might have construed § 1505(a) to apply only to non-commercial
importation. "[O]nce an acceptable limiting construction is obtained, it may be ap.
plied to conduct occurring prior to the construction . . . provided such application
affords fair warning to the defendants .... " Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491
n.7 (1965). Thus, Luros could only claim that the distinction between commercial and
non-commercial purpose was so vague that "fair warning" had not been given, a dubious
argument in view of his stipulation. See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional
Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962); Note, The Overbreadth Doc-
trine, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 844 (1970).
96. 402 U.S. at 376.
97. Id. at 376-77 (emphasis added).
98. Justice Stewart concurred on the ground that the First Amendment does not
prevent seizure of obscene materials imported for commercial distribution, but objected
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Both on the basis of its facts-commercial purpose was stipulated-and
the reservations of the majority, 37 Photos cannot be said to have re-
solved the issue of whether importation of obscene material for private
use may constitutionally be prohibited. 00
Under no construction of the 37 Photos decision is the First Amend-
ment theory of Stanley tenable. The plurality flatly deny that obscenity
is within the First Amendment. The concurring opinions of Justices
Harlan and Stewart imply the same conclusion in their unqualified
willingness' to prohibit importation for commercial purposes.1 02
The Stanley privacy-plus theory, however, continues to offer a har-
monizing alternative. Assume, contrary to the stipulated facts, that
Luros had imported the thirty-seven photographs with provable intent
to view them privately. The privacy-plus combination of fundamental
individual interests, which in Stanley triumphed over governmental in-
terests in regulating obscenity, could not be any less preferred merely
because the photographs were in a suitcase which could be lawfully
searched by customs rather than in a home which could be lawfully
searched by the police.103 To the extent that private possession of
to any implication that such material imported for private use could be confiscated.
402 U.S. at 378-79. In a dissenting opinion Justice Marshall argued that Stanley pro-
scribed such seizure from private possession and that the Government could protect its
valid interests if and when commercial distribution should occur. Id. at 360.62. Justices
Black and Douglas dissented, contending that the First Amendment fully protected
obscene material. Id. at 379.
99. Justice Harlan's concurrence was premised on the belief that § 1305(a) wnas con-
stitutional as applied to importation for commercial purpose. Since he contended that
Luros lacked standing to raise the rights of private importers under an overbreadth
claim, he saw no need to consider the constitutionality of a ban on private importation
of obscene material. Id. at 377-78. See note 95 supra for additional discussion of the
standing issue.
100. The issue of whether 19 US.C. § 1305(a) (1970) is constitutional as applied to
importation of obscene material for private use has now been posed squarely, in United
States v. Twelve Two-Hundred Foot Reels of Film, prob. juris. noted, 404 US. 813 (1971).
See also United States v. Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise, 315 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 935 (1970) (§ 1305(a) unconstitutional as applied to impor-
tation of obscene material for private use).
101. Neither concurrence suggested that a showing of a subordinating state interest
was required to effect prohibition of obscene material imported for commercial purposes.
See 402 U.S. at 377-79.
102. A right to import obscene material for commercial use follows from a First
Amendment theory of Stanley under the same logic that extrapolates a right to dis-
tribute commercially from the right to possess. See note 76 supra. A denial of the
required result necessarily implies rejection of the initial premise that obscenity is
fully protected by the First Amendment, absent showing of a subordinating state interest.
Compare the district court's derivation of the right to commercial importation, note 91
supra.
103. Justice Marshall rejected any attempt to distinguish between the two situations
for the purpose of applying Stanley principles:
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obscenity in Luros' suitcase and in Stanley's home can thus be analo-
gized,104 privacy-plus would require proscription of government ef-
forts to enforce a ban on obscene material imported for private use.
Thus, the refusal of a majority of the 37 Photos Court to uphold such
Stanley turned on an assessment of which state interests legitimately underpin
governmental action, and it is disingenuous to contend that Stanley's conviction was
reversed because his home, rather than his person or luggage, was the locus of a
search.
402 U.S. at 360 (dissenting opinion).
104. In terms of the governmental interests involved, there are two possible differ-
ences which suggest that the situations may not be analogous. First, it might be thought
that governmental interests in privately possessed obscenity at the border are stronger
than when it is possessed in the home because it is difficult to determine what Is in.
tended for private use. Once past the border, the material is realistically irretrievable.
However, this contention, that a ban on private possession is a necessary adjunct to a
statutory scheme prohibiting public distribution, was specifically rejected in Stanley, 391
U.S. at 567-68.
Second, it might be argued that because customs procedures are in rein and no crime
is charged, the congressional power to exclude does not run afoul of normal constitu-
tional sensitivities. However, on at least one occasion, this theory has been flatly
rejected:
The Government attempts to avoid [A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964)] by arguing that the First Amendment has no inhibitory effect on Congress's
"complete" control of foreign commerce. This novel theory is not buttressed by
citation to a single court opinion which has ever intimated such a possibility. The
only rationale offered in support of the theory is to the effect that unless It be
accepted, there will be practical limitations on the ability of Congress to restrict
the importation of "obscene" books or other material. This may well be. However,
Constitutional guarantees may not be subverted to expediency ...
The Government goes on to argue that even if the First Amendment does apply
to Congressional powers over foreign commerce, it would not prohibit a law au-
thorizing summary seizure of foreign magazines. . . . [T]he essence of the First
Amendment right to freedom of the press is not so much the right to print as It is
the right to read. The rights of readers are not to be curtailed because of the geo.
graphical origin of printed materials.
United States v. Eighteen Packages of Magazines, 238 F. Supp. 846, 847-48 (N.D. Cal.
1964). Such a theory would also appear to be negated by Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965) (requirement that individtal must submit request in writing to
receive "foreign Communist propaganda" in the mail held unconstitutional abridgement
of First Amendment rights). Finally, such an argument is implicitly rejected by the 37
Photos plurality in its efforts to rewrite § 1305(a) to conform to the procedural re-
quirements of Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). See note 92 supra. If in rein
customs procedures were not subject to the First Amendment, no consideration of the
procedural issue would have been required.
In terms of the individual interests involved, there are also two possible differences
between possession of obscene material in the home and in a suitcase carried in public.
First, it could be suggested the First Amendment interest half of the privacy.plus equa.
tion is somehow changed because an individual is merely carrying obscene material to
some sanctum for private perusal rather than actively exercising his First Amendment
interests at the time. But potential exercise of First Amendment rights has traditionally
been guarded almost as vigorously as their actual exercise. See Lamont v. Postmaster
General, supra; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).
Second, it could be argued that the interests embodied in the other half of the privacy-
plus equation, a private locus of possession, are different when obscene material is
possessed in the home or in a suitcase. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) sug.
gests that determination of whether a locus of privacy exists does not depend on a
specific geographical area but instead on an evaluation of whether the individual has
reasonable expectations that his activities have been removed from the perceptions of
the general public. Id. at 351-52. Cf. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482-83 (1968).
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a ban permits Stanley's continued vitality under the doctrine of
privacy-plus. 105
IV. Privacy-Plus: Old Wine In A New Bottle?
Privacy-plus is more than just an isolated harmonizing principle
for the Stanley, Reidel and 37 Photos decisions. Basically rooted in
"chilling effect" doctrine, privacy-plus represents a label of conven-
ience for an amalgam of familiar constitutional principles first brought
into focus on obscenity problems in Stanley. Neither Roth nor sub-
sequent Court decisions on obscenity issues had encountered the pre-
cise problem posed by Stanley's privately possessed films. Confronted
with this extreme situation, the Stanley majority drew back from the
full implications of the Roth two-level theory and refused to allow the
governmental regulatory interest to be "insulated from all constitu-
tional protections"'106 in every context. Under privacy-plus, the "con-
stitutional protections" discerned by the Stanley majority were those
relating to protection of traditional First Amendment rights of the
individual, 0 7 considered in the particular context of a locus of privacy
in which obscene, and therefore illegal, materials were possessed. To
protect the general exercise of such rights from inhibition, limitations
were established on the otherwise valid governmental power to regu-
late obscenity. The consequence of these limitations was that posses-
sion of obscene material in a locus of privacy could not be subjected
Under this construction of a locus of privacy, the only significant difference bctt'een
a suitcase at the border and the home is the degree of certainty that search by public
officials will transpire. Since disclosure to these officials cannot be held tantamount to
disclosure to the "perceptions of the general public" under the Kat: formulation-to do
so would make every situation susceptible of state intervention a public one-there
would appear to be no material difference between possession of obscene material in a
suitcase and in the home. Arguments that suitcases may break open and spill their
contents, etc., would lead to the exclusion of all potentially offensive items, such as
contraceptives, from suitcases.
105. Justice Stewart clearly perceived the implications for Stanley of the plurality's
dictum on private importation:
The terms of the statute [19 U.S.C. § 1305(a)] appear to apply to an American
tourist who ... returns home with a single book in his luggage, with no intention
of selling it or otherwise using it, exqept to read it. If the Government can con-
stitutionally take the book away from him as he passes through customs, then I
do not understand the meaning of Stanley v. Georgia ....
United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 379 (concurring opinion).
Another analysis which suggests that Stanley's protection of obscene material in the
home survives Reidel and 37 Photos, and merits extension to all situations involving
mere private possession, may be found in The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAIs. L.
REv. 3, 235-37 (1971).
106. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563 (1969).
107. See p. 318 and note 61 supra.
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to criminal sanctions. Privacy-plus thus appears to be a special appli-
cation of tie more familiar theory of the "chilling effect,"1 08 combined
with privacy principles, to the field of constitutional obscenity doc-
trine.
A generalized theory of privacy-plus can be illustrated utilizing one
of the individual rights recognized in Stanley, "the right to read or
observe what [one] pleases," 100 and an application of "chilling effect"
principles. This "right to read or observe what one pleases" necessarily
implies the right to receive, and therefore to possess, all constitutionally
protected materials.110 But since inhibition as well as prohibition of
the exercise of First Amendment rights is a power denied to the gov
emnment,'l 1 the scope of sanctions against the possession of unpro.
tected material must also be carefully limited. If an individual is de-
terred from acquiring and possessing a non-obscene book because lie
fears that it may be obscene and that he will be punished for its pos-
session, his right to "read or observe what he pleases" has clearly been
"inhibited." The First Amendment will not tolerate any law which
causes a man returning home from his local bookstore to wonder
whether his latest purchase may lead to his arrest.
It is no answer that the line between the obscene and the non.
obscene is sufficiently clear that acquisition of the latter will not be
deterred. As the Court itself has observed:
[T]he line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech
which may legitimately be regulated. ., is finely drawn .... The
separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for ... sen-
sitive tools .... 112
The employment of such "sensitive tools" can hardly be expected from
the average citizen, especially since members of the Court itself, using
108. One Justice has explained the "chilling effect" doctrine as affecting both cub.
stantive and procedural rights:
To give these freedoms [those of the First Amendment] the necessary "breathing
space to survive" . . . the Court has modified rules of standing and prematurity .
We have molded both substantive rights and procedural remedies in the face of
varied conflicting interests to conform to our overriding duty to insulate all indi.
viduals from the "chilling effect" upon exercise of First Amendment freedoms
generated by vagueness, overbreadth and unbridled discretion to limit their exercise.
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 588 U.S. 307, 344-45 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See,
Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLU,. L. REv. 808, 826 (1969).
109. 394 US. at 565. See note 61 supra.
110. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 819 U.S. 1 1,
143 (1943).
111. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 309 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
112. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
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such "tools," reach such dramatically different results.113 Moreover,
"[w]hat is good literature, what has educational value, what is refined
public information, what is good art, varies with individuals as it does
from one generation to the other.""14 While the Court has rejected a
vagueness attack on the definition of obscenity in a commercial con-
text,115 it has not weighed the issue with reference to inhibitions of a
private individual's "right to read or observe what he pleases"-inhibi-
tions inherent in governmental attempts to ban possession of obscene
materials. Privacy-plus analysis, the Stanley holding,-and the traditional
concern for First Amendment freedoms suggest that these inhibitions
are unconstitutional." 6 Privacy-plus requires that the individual be
allowed to read or observe obscene material in private in order to safe-
guard his First Amendment rights to read or observe non-obscene
material.
Privacy-plus does not, however, proscribe governmental efforts, in
the form of prohibitions on commercial distribution, to make it im-
possible for an individual to acquire obscene material. If a person is
physically unable to find an obscene book to buy or an obscene movie
to watch, his right to acquire or view non-obscene materials is not
inhibited. Privacy-pluhs merely states that once an individual has ac-
quired obscene material, by whatever means," 7 and so long as that
113. See note 16 supra.
114. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 157 (1946).
115. A plurality of the Court denied that obscenity standards i'ere vague in the com-
mercial context of Roth:
[WV]e hold that these statutes, applied according to the proper standard for judging
obscenity, do not offend constitutional safeguards against convictions based upon
protected material, or fail to give men in acting adequate notice of what is prohibited.
United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957) (Brennan. J.). However, after experiencing
difficulty in applying Roth's standards, Justice Brennan may have had second thoughts
concerning its clarity. On one occasion he conceded that the Roth test admits of a
"perhaps inherent residual vagueness," Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475 n.19
(1966), and on another that it contains "ambiguities inherent in the definition of ob-
scenity." Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1956). Justice Harlan has been more
explicit in his criticism of the uncertainties stemming from Roth:
The upshot of all of this divergence in viewpoint is that anyone who undertakes
to examine the Court's decisions since Roth which have held particular material
obscene or not would find himself in utter bewildermenL
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
116. [T]he necessity for safeguarding First Amendment protections for non-obscene
materials means that the Government "is not free to adopt whatever procedures it
pleases for dealing with obscenity . ..without regard to the possible consequences
for constitutionally protected speech."
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 518 (1962) (Brennan, J.. concurring)
quoting from Marchs v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961). See also Monaghan,
First Amendment Due Process, 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518-19 (1970).
117. It might be suggested that a consequence of allowing private possession of ob-
scenity while prohibiting legal distribution would be a widespread black market. Gov-
ernment inability to enforce obscenity laws may suggest the unwisdom of such laws but
problems of enforcement cannot be used as an excuse to infringe or inhibit First
Amendment freedoms. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1959).
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material is retained for private use,118 the state may levy sanctions
against the individual for possession of itl19 only upon showing a sub-
ordinating state interest.
1 20
Commercial distributors of obscenity cannot invoke privacy-plus to
defend their trade. Under the First Amendment theory of Stanley, an
individual would have a "right to possess" obscene material, and limi-
tations on governmental power to proscribe sales could be extrapolated
118. The scope of the term "private use" is obviously a key issue. Would private
use include, for example, reading an obscene book on a public bus? Showing obscene
films to friends at home? To strangers? Lending an obscene picture to a friend? Mailing
an obscene picture to friends? To strangers? One standard would be whether the Indi-
vidual had reasonable expectations that he has removed his activity and the obscene
material from the perception of the general public. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S,
347, 351-52 (1967). Compare United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-53 (1971). Such
a standard yields results on situs issues fairly easily, e.g., exposing obscene material to
others on a bus would probably be within the public's perceptions. But the standard
does not readily suggest where along the spectrum, reaching from exposure to one other
person to exposure to a number of persons, the state may legitimately intervene to
prevent public distribution. The issue would be further complicated by considerations
of the relationship between transferor and transferees, i.e., giving obscene material to
two friends might remain without the perception of the general public but giving such
material to two strangers might be said to admit of no reasonable expectation that the
material would remain outside of the public's domain. Vor a holding that exchange of
obscene material through the mails by friendly correspondents was a "private relation-
ship," see United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252, 1258 (2d Cir. 1970).
The scope of the term "private use" has been posed directly to the Court in United
States v. Orito (E.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 1970) (unreported), prob. juris. noted, 404 U.S. 819
(1971), in the context of another federal anti-obscenity statute prohibiting interstate
shipment of obscene material by common carrier, 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970). The respective
interests of government and the individual affected by interstate transport for private
use are no different than those involved in importation for private use, Cf. note 101
supra. In either situation, the doctrine of privacy-plus requires protection of such ship-
ments absent proof of commercial purpose or of a subordinating state interest.
A decision holding § 1462 constitutional as applied to interstate shipment of obscene
material for private use would imply rejection of the last remaining doctrinal basis of
Stanley and, in effect, would limit that case to its facts. Justice Black's prophecy would
then be wholly fulfilled:
[P]erhaps in the future that case [Stanley] will be recognized as good law only when
a man writes salacious books in his attic, prints them in his basement, and reads
them in his living room.
402 U.S. at 382 (dissenting opinion).
119. It has been suggested that one method of avoiding the "chilling" problem in
obscenity regulation is to adopt methods of control other than criminal prosectitlons
such as in rem civil proceedings. The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91,
193 (1966). Such methods might reduce the degree of "chilling" but would not eliminate
the problem. The threat of investigation of the contents of one's library has a deterrent
effect on book purchase even though such investigation may only be for the purpose
of confiscation. Purchasers of books abroad would still hesitate to acquire anything
which might be taken away by customs if only to avoid risking financial loss.
120. Since privacy-plus merely extends the protection of the First Amendment to
certain forms of private individual activity, the scope of its protection is no greater thian
that normally granted by the First Amendment. A subordinating state interest in the
regulation of a subject within the state's constitutional power may justify limiting
First Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). Thus,
if an individual in the privacy of his home shows obscene material to the neighbor's
children, state sanctions against such exhibition may be invoked, since protection of
minors from exposure to obscene material has been recognized as a subordinating state
interest. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968). Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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therefrom.12 1 But the privacy-plus theory as formulated here merely
states that the government may not enforce its ban on obscenity in the
context of private possession of obscene materials-not because the
materials are protected, but for fear of the consequences that might
flow from such intrusions. The protection of privately-possessed ob-
scenity is a prophylactic limitation on the reach of an otherwise valid
governmental power. No "right to possess and receive" obscene ma-
terial exists, hence no corollary right to sell or distribute such material
can be generated.
A distributor of obscenity might attempt to assert the "rights" of
potential readers of his material. But privacy-plus does not protect the
right of any individual to buy an obscene book,122 nor does it protect
against a possible inhibition of the right to acquire non-obscene ma-
terial, created by distributors' reluctance to carry items which border
on the obscene. Although one consequence of a distributor's uncer-
tainty about what is obscene may be the non-availability of some con-
stitutionally protected materials for some individuals, this "chilling" is
different from that which underlies privacy-plus. Privacy-plus estab-
lishes limitations on governmental sanctions directed against the indi-
vidual for private use of obscene material. The direct threat of such
sanctions is likely to "chill" the exercise of the individual's First
Amendment rights to a much greater degree than any indirect "chill-
ing" caused by a distributor's failure to carry certain titles.123
121. See note 76 supra.
122. See pp. 329-50 supra.
123. The principal difference between a bookseller's apprehension of the line between
the obscene and the non-obscene and the private individual's is that the bookseller has
an incentive to move as closely to the line as the law will allow. Motivated by profit.
the distributor who deals in erotica will likely familiarize himself with some of the
"nicer" distinctions in obscenity definitions. He can afford the services of legal counsel
both to tell him what he may carry and to provide assistance should he stray over the
line. The private individual has neither the incentive to become an obscenity "expert"
nor the resources to procure counsel and defense.
The indirect "chilling" of distribution of protected material occasioned by obscenity
laws was considered in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). The solution adopted
was the requirement of a strict scienter element in obscenity statutes. Justice Brennan,
writing for a majority of the Court, recognized that even after the requirement of
"knowing sale" had been imposed, some degree of "chilling" of potential purchasers'
rights would remain, but did not consider the issue further. Id. at 154-55. In a con-
curring opinion Justice Frankfurter speculated philosophically that such consequences
were unavoidable:
As a practical matter therefore the exercise of the constitutional rights of a State
to regulate obscenity will carry with it some hazard to the dissemination by a book-
seller of non-obscene literature. Such difficulties or hazards are inherent in many
domains of the law for the simple reason that law cannot avail itself of factors
ascertained quantitatively or even wholly impersonally.
Id. at 164. The Court's refusal to consider a vagueness attack on the definition of
obscenity may also be taken as an implied rejection of an argument based on a "chilling"
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Privacy-plus is thus a purely preventive doctrine. Its protection of
private possession of obscene material does not lay the foundation for
a broader doctrine which would protect the sale or distribution of
obscenity under the First Amendment.
124
V. Stanley and The Future Contours of Obscenity Doctrine
It is clear, at a minimum, that for the present Court Stanley is not
the revolution in obscenity doctrine that it was initially proclaimed
to be.12 5 The contention in Reidel that the right to possess obscenity
in the home does not depend on whether such material is constitu-
tionally protected 2 6 and the description of obscenity as "contraband"
in 37 Photos'2 7 make it clear, to paraphrase Roth, that obscenity is
still not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. 25
The rejection of the First Amendment theory of Stanley in Reidel
and 37 Photos should not, however, be applauded. Bringing "obscene"
material within the First Amendment would relieve the judicial system
of the dreary burden of adjudicating the obscenity vel non of countless
of rights resulting from a distributor's uncertainty about what is obscene. See note 115
supra.
Features of a system of obscenity regulation other than the definition of obscenity
itself must, however, conform to strict procedures that will ensure against curtailment
of constitutionally protected material. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66
(1963) (system of "informal" administrative censorship violates Fourteenth Amendment),
See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S.
717 (1961).
124. However, similar application of "chilling" and privacy principles to other First
Amendment rights, recognized by the Stanley majority, offers the possibility of develop.
ing privacy-plus doctrine applicable to a broad range of private individual activity. For
example, the "right to satisfy [one's] emotional needs," 394 U.S. at 565, might be ex.
trapolated into a general doctrine of limitation on state power to prescribe standards of
private sexual conduct for consenting adults absent showing of a subordinating state
interest. One lower court has apparently accepted such a doctrine already. On the
basis of Stanley, In re Labody, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), holds that private
homosexual acts are irrelevant to a determination of whether one "has been and still
is a person of good moral character" for the purposes of a naturalization petition, in
the absence of a showing of corruption of the morals of minors. Id. at 930. Cf. Doe v,
Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
It might also be thought that the recommendations of the recent report of the National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse incorporate privacy-plus principles. The
major features of the recommended scheme are that production and distribution of
marijuana would remain criminal activities as would possession with intent to distribute
commercially; marijuana would be contraband subject to confiscation in public places,
but all criminal sanctions would be withdrawn from private use and possession incident
to such use. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1972, § 1, at 19, col. 1.
125. On the other hand neither Reidel nor 37 Photos necessarily presage Court ap-
proval of a "Federal Drive on Pornography." Cf. New York Times, Oct. 10, 1971, at
82, col. 3.
126. 402 U.S. at 356.
127. 402 U.S. at 377.
128. See pp. 309-10 supra.
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new entertainments. 120 The Court has shown signs of unhappiness with
this consequence of the two-level theory in its continued practice of
per curiam reversals of obscenity convictions on the apparent grounds
that the prosecution failed to show pandering, obtrusive advertising
or exploitation of juveniles. 130 If the Court is in fact retreating from
the burden of adjudicating obscenity definitions, it would seem more
appropriate to articulate this policy than to cloak it in the haze of
ambiguous case-by-case dispositions. 13'
A call for a return to First Amendment principles in obscenity regu-
lation has been made before.? 2 Stanley, however, offered the first op-
portunity to make such a doctrinal shift with a minimum of disloca-
tion. Although that opportunity was not utilized, if Stanley is given
a privacy-plus gloss its doctrine can remain as an important limitation
on the reach of Roth and the two-level theory. Absolving the courts
of the necessity for adjudicating the obscenity vel non of materials in
private possession is a step forward. The protection privacy-plus offers
for a variety of private individual activities' 33 is also encouraging.
Further consideration of Stanley's scope should focus on retaining the
principles of privacy-plus.
129. Reidel and 37 Photos were deceptively easy cases for the Court because in both
the obscene character of the materials n question had been stipulated below. Far less
ink was spilled than in a case like A Book v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (196),
where obscenity vel non was directly at issue.
130. Between 1967 and 1971 the Supreme Court summarily reversed per curian more
than 20 obscenity convictions, citing only Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967 . The
Court's action is somewhat ambiguous because the Redrup citation can be given tsvo
different interpretations. Either the material in all of these cases met none of the ob-
scenity definitions employed by members of the Court or, since such material is obscene
only in the context of pandering, obtrusive advertising, intrusions on the public or
exploitation of juveniles, a failure to prove one of these contexts was a failure to prove
obscenity vel non. See 386 U.S. at 769-71. The second interpretation seems more likely
in view of Justice Harlan's nearly consistent pattern of dissent in such cases under his
variable standards doctrine. See note 16 supra. In the face of these dissents, joined
frequently by Chief Justice Burger after 1968, one cannot reasonably my that the
material in such cases meets none of the obscenity definitions employed by the Court.
131. Chief Justice Burger has sharply criticized the policy of Redrup per curiam
reversals:
I find no justification, constitutional or otherwise, for this Court's assuning the role
of a supreme and unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively
judging each piece of material brought before it without regard to the findings or
conclusions of other courts, state or federal. That is not one of the purposes for
which this Court was established.
Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
132. See, e.g., T. E.,imsoN, supra note 19, at 495-503; Engdahl, supra note 22; Note.
Stanley v. Georgia: New Directions in Obscenity Regulation?, 48 TEX. L. REv. 646, 659.60
(1970); Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364, 1402-03 (1966).
Oregon has already adopted legislation creating a system of obscenity regulation
based on First Amendment principles. Under ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 167.060.167.100 (1971)
adults may sell, purchase, and possess obscene material unless the distribution threatens
exposure to juveniles or unwilling recipients.
133. See note 124 supra.
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